by Pierluigi Franco

(ANSA) - The West pretends to be surprised of Putin's approach on Ukraine, and pretends to be surprised if the Kremlin's leader looks smugly to West and to the presumed sanctions. Yet, Putin is premier with great cleverness and, over all, of great culture. Vladimir Vladimirovich, expert in international law and "cared" by the KGB elite University, knows well that history is on his side. Also, he knows the thoughts and secrets of the West. In the great game of chess on the future of Ukraine, then, he plays his moves with the clear intent of "marking the territory", and not only figuratively. In the optic of the new balances of the area, therefore, Putin could not have allowed Crimea, already independent Republic, to remain Ukraine. Historical reasons, firstly, as well as understandable strategic reasons. For Russians, as all Slavic bound to the roots and to the emotionalism of history, the peninsula of Crimea is an essential part of its own territory. It certainly is since 1783, when the Empress Catherine II decided its annexation to Russia pulling up it from the Ottoman domain. And so, Crimea remained Russian until 1954.
Indeed, it was in that year that Nikita Khrushchev, grown in Ukraine and for long time been secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, surprisingly decided to consolidate its support in Kiev giving the peninsula to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine, which was still part of the USSR. This was one of the first actions of Stalin successor. Even in this case the occasion was given from history: the donation occurred to celebrate the 300 years of the treaty of Pereiaslav, who brought the Cossacks under the Russian protection at the expense of Poland and sanctioned the expansion of Russia in Ukraine up to the Dnieper. To sign the treaty of 1654 were the Tsar Alexis I and the Cossack Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky, whose huge equestrian statue still stands in the centre of Kiev.
In 1991 Ukraine, orphan of USSR, started its independence path putting on display the two souls which always undermine the unity. To the East there is the most industrialised and mining area that has always looked to Moscow, where Russian is spoken and the Orthodox Church is headed by the Patriarch of Moscow; while to the West is spoken Ukrainian, is looked to Europe and to the neighbouring Poland of which they feel part, and the Uniate Church refers to Rome. An atavistic dualism by which the Crimea seems to be out in any case. Since 1783, the Peninsula, actually Russian inside, has always jealously kept the historic Black Sea Fleet, pride of the Russian Navy of the Tsars, then Soviet, and now Russian again. Sevastopol, until a few days ago, was so the only city in the world where two navies co-existed (Russia and Ukraine). To establish this was an agreement signed between Ukraine and Russia in 1997, then renewed in 2010. From last March 18th, the situation has changed; the referendum has decreed the return of Crimea (and Sevastopol) to Russia, keeping the status of an independent republic that already had with Ukraine. And for Kiev it has become an occupied territory, while EU and USA are protesting against the manoeuvres of Moscow retained illegitimate. Meanwhile, following the referendum, the Crimea adopted the Russian Ruble as official currency. Also the time zone changes, and from that of Kiev (+2 hours from Greenwich) it is converted to that of Moscow (+4 hours).
Throughout this, Putin does not seem to worry too much about Western disapproval. He knows well that Europe, today, cannot stay without Russia, especially for energy supplies. And it is also reasonable to think that, beyond the appearances, some important pawns are moving on the diplomatic front. On the other hand, the fractured Ukraine cannot go far just with Europe. The same geographical and "climatic" factors impose necessarily a nonviolent vision towards the East. Maidan is still too close.
However the impression is that to declare the end of Viktor Ianukovich has been the Kremlin by the say of Dmitri Medvedev in the square tumults: "It is necessary for our partners to have an influence, and that the power in Ukraine is legitimate and effective, and that it will not be stepped on like a doormat".
And far from being a doormat is definitely the leader Yulia Tymoshenko who, despite the contrasts of the facade, is not so unpleasant for the Russians. No one has forgotten her visit to Moscow in April 2009 when she was received with all the honours in the Kremlin by Putin. The Lady of Kiev did not hesitate so to define the differences between Russia and Ukraine "something now passed.'' Not be forgotten that Yulia, started out from the Soviet Komsomol, has arrived at the top of Ukrainian politics after having had economic fortune in the 90s as President of the 'General Energy Company' and having played a leading role in managing the affairs related to Russian gas. Just from the Russian gas, however, her troubles came also. She was arrested for the first time in 2001 for illegal import of natural gas, returned to prison with a sentence related to a supply contract after coming of the opponent Yanukovich, she is now finding new spaces after his release. The leader of the 2004 'Orange Revolution' is still in the consideration of many Russians. In addition to being leader of the Communist Komsomol (that Moscow still feel like something of its own), the name Tymoshenko still reminds into Russians memory the hero Semyon Konstantinovich, the Ukrainian general who faced the Hitler's first move forwards after having had the intuition to develop the production of crucial Soviet tanks. Also for this reason it has always been much forgiven to Yulia. It is not difficult to think that she could just be, in the next future, the mediator able to restore the balance with the Kremlin looking at West. (ANSA)